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In a lengthy opinion by the Alaska District Court, the battle for a 
proposed medical emergency road through the Izembek National Refuge stalled. 
The court held that the Department of the Interior’s No Action Alternative 
blocked the construction of the road was decided in accordance within the 
Department’s authority. It is not the end of the battle over the road, as the court 
alluded that Congress may be able to change this decision.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At issue in Agdaagux Tribe of King Cove v. Jewell was whether the “No 
Action Alternative” adopted by the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) 
violated either the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) or the Omnibus 
Public Land Management Act of 2009 (“OPLMA”).1 The plaintiffs, tribal entities 
(“KCG”) and the State of Alaska, challenged the decision to block a land 
exchange that would allow the construction of a road through the Izembek 
National Refuge (“Refuge”). The defendants were federal agencies, including 
Department of the Interior, the United States Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”) 
and numerous environmental advocacy groups.2 While the plaintiffs possessed 
standing to bring the NEPA claim under the Administrative Policy Act (“APA”), 
the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held there was no merit 
to the contention that the Secretary’s decision regarding landing crafts and the 
land value of proposed exchanged land was arbitrary or capricious.3 Citing the 
OPLMA, the court concluded that while Congress recognized the benefits of the 
road, its delegation of the road project to the Secretary with instructions to meet 
NEPA standards “probably doomed the project.”4  The court granted summary 
judgment and dismissed the numerous claims with prejudice.5  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  
A. Standard of Review 
 
 A review of the Secretary’s decision under the OPLMA and NEPA is 
governed by the APA, which allows a decision to be overturned only when it is 
found to be “arbitrary and capricious.”6 In a NEPA claim, the court is to ensure 
that the “agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the potential environmental 
consequences of the proposed action.”7 
 
                                                 
1  Agdaagux Tribe of King Cove v. Jewell, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 118882, at *24 (D. Alaska Sept. 8, 2015) [hereinafter Agdaagux v. Jewell]. 
2  Id. at *2-3. 
3  Id. at *33. 
4  Id. at *56.  
5  Id. at *57. 
6  Id. at *8.  
7  Id. (quoting Klammath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 
F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
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B.  Factual Background 
 
The Alaskan communities of King Cove and Cold Bay are located 
eighteen miles apart within the Refuge, and are accessible solely by air or sea.8 
Since the 1980’s, KCG has lobbied for an emergency-use-only road to link the 
two communities through the Refuge.9 King Cove hosts the only all-weather 
airport in the area.10 Proponents of the road argue that the road is a safe, reliable, 
and affordable way to access King Cove airport when weather prohibits safe 
evacuations on water.11  
The Izembek National Refuge was established in 1980 as part of the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”).12 The Refuge 
was created to conserve fish and wildlife habitats, fulfill the treaty obligations of 
the United States, and to ensure water quality and quantity.13 The refuge is home 
to many protected species of wildlife and is home to the  “world famous eelgrass 
beds” that attract the “largest concentration of migratory birds” in the area.14  
 Congress has attempted to solve the medical evacuation issues from Cold 
Bay to King Cove for years.15 In 1999, Congress appropriated around thirty-
seven million dollars to the communities to improve the King Cove airstrip and 
heath clinic and to construct a road-hovercraft link.16 The hovercraft was used 
from 2007 until 2011, when the Aleutian East Borough (“AEB”) ceased 
operating the hovercraft, due to reliability and financial concerns.17  
 
C.  Litigation Background 
 
In 2009, Congress passed the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 
2009 (“OPLMA”), which, among other things, authorized the Secretary to 
conduct a land exchange of Refuge land for both Alaska and KCG land.18 The 
purpose of the land exchange was to construct a single-lane gravel road, 
primarily used for health and safety reasons. 19  The OPLMA required the 
Secretary to comply with the NEPA, and all other applicable law, before 
exchanging the land.20 Specifically, the NEPA analysis was to investigate the 
proposed land exchange, the potential construction and use of the road between 
the communities, and to evaluate a road corridor.21 Additionally, the OPLMA 
allowed certain entities to be involved as “cooperating agencies”, including 
Alaska, AEB, King Cove, and the Agdaagux Tribe.22  
                                                 
8  Id. at *3.  
9  Id. at *5. 
10  Id. at *3. 
11  Id. at *5-6. 
12  Id. at *3-4. 
13  Pub. L. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).  
14  Agdaagux v. Jewell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118882, at *4-5. 
15  Id. at *6.  
16  Id. at *6; see Pub. L. 105-277, § 353, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999).  
17  Agdaagux v. Jewell. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118882, at *6.  
18  Id. at *7-8; Omnibus Public Land Management Act, Pub. L. 111-11, § 6402(a), 
123 Stat. 991 (2009). 
19  Pub. L. 111-11, § 6403(a)(1)(A). 
20  Id. § 6402(b)(1).  
21  Id. § 6402(b)(2)(B) 
22  Agdaagux v. Jewell. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118882, at *9. 
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Once the OPLMA was enacted, the Secretary directed the FWS to 
conduct an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the proposed road.23 
After publishing a Notice of Intent and holding seven public scoping meetings in 
2010, the FWS developed five alternatives for the road.24 In 2011, AEB sent a 
letter to the FWS informing them that the hovercraft would no longer be used.25 
In early 2012, AEB sent a second letter to the FWS describing a possible 
alternative maritime evacuation method, an aluminum landing craft, should the 
Secretary not approve the land exchange.26  The FWS published a draft EIS 
(“DEIS”) on March 19, 2012, and opened public comment.27 Shortly thereafter, 
the FWS reached out to AEB about the aluminum landing craft to incorporate 
that information into the “No Action Alternative” in the EIS.28 In response, AEB 
reminded the FWS that the aluminum craft was a “concept,” that the concept had 
yet to be subject to public discussion, and as such no concrete details were 
available.29  
The final EIS (“FEIS”) was published on February 6, 2013, and public 
comment was opened.30 KCG commented, arguing that the FEIS was deficient 
because it did not use “available information about operability of the conceptual 
landing craft.”31 Shortly after, Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs 
Kevin Washburn was sent to King Cove and Cold Bay to tour, assess medical 
benefits of the road, and to provide a report to the Secretary.32 In August, the 
Secretary traveled to King Cove and Cold Bay to hold official meetings and 
receive testimony.33 The “No Action Alternative” was adopted on December 23, 
2013.34  
KCG commenced this APA action on June 4, 2014, challenging the No 
Action Alternative.35 On December 19, 2014, the court dismissed a number of the 
alleged claims and reduced the claims alleging that the Secretary violated both 
the OPLMA and the NEPA.36  KCG moved for summary-judgment on these 
claims, and the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on the remaining 
claims.37  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The court analyzed four broad issues on appeal. First, the court held that 
KCB had standing to bring the NEPA claim;38 second, it concluded the “No 
Action Alternative” decision based on a potential landing craft was not arbitrary 
                                                 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at *9-10. 
25  Id. at *10-11.  
26  Id. 
27  Id. at *12.  
28  Id. at *12-13. 
29  Id. at *14.  
30  Id. at *15. 
31  Id. at *16.  
32  Id.  
33  Id. at *18.  
34  Id.  
35  Id. at *24. 
36  Id. at *23-24. 
37  Id. at *24. 
38 Id. at *28. 
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or capricious;39 third, it held the Secretary took the required “hard look” at the 
value of proposed land subject to exchange;40 and fourth, the court concluded that 
the report written by Washburn did not violate the NEPA.41  
 
A. Standing to Bring NEPA Suit 
  
 The defendants argued that the health and safety concerns alleged by 
KCB did not coincide with the NEPA’s purpose because there was not a strong 
enough environmental impact alleged by the defendants.42  To bring a NEPA 
claim under the APA, a plaintiff must allege an interest within the “zone of 
interests” that are either regulated or protected by the statute or a constitutional 
guarantee,43 and must allege an injury to the environment.44 The court found that 
the health and safety interests fell within the NEPA’s zone of interests because 
the plaintiffs were deemed “cooperating agencies” for the NEPA proceedings.45 
Because KCB included landowners potentially subject to the land exchange, the 
owners had standing to question the evaluation of proposed lands.46 The court 
also held that without the ability to question the decision, the value of the 
designation “cooperating agency” would be diminished.47  
 
B.  NEPA Arguments: Landing Craft 
 
 KCB alleged that the Secretary’s determination that an aluminum 
landing craft was a reasonable and viable alternative to the road was arbitrary and 
capricious, in violation of the NEPA.48 While KCB alleged multiple reasons why 
this decision was not made correctly, the court ultimately disagreed.49 The court 
held that because the Secretary did not conclude the landing craft was a viable 
alternative to the road, but did note the landing craft was being “considered” by 
the AEB, her finding that an aluminum landing craft was a reasonable and viable 
alternative, which was neither arbitrary nor capricious.50  
 Critically, while the Secretary used language suggesting the aluminum 
landing craft could be a viable alternative, she did not rely on the craft as the 
solution.51 The Secretary acknowledged that the craft “holds promise” and may 
or may not happen.52 This discussion gave the court the ability to find for the 
Secretary because it showed the determination that the landing craft was a 
possibility was not conclusory. 53  The court also upheld the decision that a 
                                                 
39  Id. at *31. 
40  Id. at *54. 
41  Id. at *56-57. 
42  Id. at *27. 
43  Id. at *26 (quoting Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 
715-16 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
44  Id. (quoting Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of 
Am. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
45  Id. at *27. 
46  Id. at *28.  
47  Id.  
48  Id.  
49  Id. at *31.  
50  Id. at *33. 
51  Id. at *32. 
52  Id. at *33.  
53  Id. at *31. 
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secondary EIS was not required because the introduction of the landing craft did 
not have a significant environmental impact.54  
 The plaintiff’s first argument was that the No Action Alternative must 
still meet the need and purpose of the project, and the No Action Alternative in 
consideration failed to do so.55 However, the court determined that the No Action 
Alternative did not need to meet the purpose of a project, but was “required by 
NEPA as a basis of comparison.”56 As long as the decision document explained 
the agency decision, the court concluded it could be based on “any relevant 
considerations of law and policy.”57 The court found that the Secretary’s decision 
that the No Action Alternative would be best for all of the relevant law and 
policy was based on enough evidence to support the decision to block the road.58  
 The court discussed that even if the federal agencies were opposed to the 
road, it was within the agency’s right to pre-determine the outcome before an EIS 
was completed.59 In fact, the court found it is encouraged to determine a course 
of action during the NEPA process.60 KCB brought no evidence to support the 
contention that the Secretary predetermined the decision impermissibly.61  
  
C.  NEPA Argument: Land Valuation 
 
 In addition to the numerous NEPA arguments about the landing craft, 
KCB argued that the Secretary and the FWS did not “adequately” analyze the 
value of the proposed lands subject to exchange, thus making the decision 
arbitrary and capricious.62 Despite the many arguments about the land valuation 
being undervalued, arbitrary, and contrary to past evaluations, the court decided 
that the valuation of the land did not violate the NEPA.63  
 In 1998, the FWS issued a Land Protection Plan that identified land that 
was part of the current proposed land exchange, and explained that the lands 
were high value, and had potential for development.64 However the Record of 
Decision stated that these offered lands were not likely to be developed, and the 
court determined this was not a change in policy.65 Rather, this was an evaluation 
of a specific land use proposal for the OPLMA.66 Simply put, the lands in the 
Refuge’s biggest threat is the proposed road, and the land exchange would not 
adequately make up for the ecological loss.67  
 KCB also argued that the Secretary assumed the offered lands would not 
be developed and did not take the required “hard look” at the land’s development 
                                                 
54  Id. at *34.  
55  Id. at *35. 
56  Id. at *38 (quoting California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. 
Supp. 2d 874, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2006)).  
57  Id. at *39. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. at *43.  
60  Id.  
61  Id. 
62  Id. at *43-44. 
63  Id. at *54. 
64  Id. at *44. 
65  Id. at *46. 
66  Id. at *47. 
67  Id.  
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potential.68 However, the FWS did in fact take the required “hard look” at the 
development potential, and there was enough evidence to convince the court that 
it was unlikely that development was likely or foreseeable.69 The court found 
persuasive the FWS’s determination of the wildlife and environmental value of 
the lands.70    
 The court perceived that the arguments about the “hard look” at land 
values were “simply disagreements as to the relative weight that the FWS 
accorded the impacts.” 71  The court went on to hold that despite KCB’s 
unhappiness with the land comparison value, it did not mean the FWS or 
Secretary acted in an “arbitrary or capricious manner.”72   
 
D.  Washburn Report 
 
 KCB argued that Washburn’s report to the Secretary violated the NEPA 
because it failed to “adequately discuss” the need for the road for medical 
purposes.73 However, the court found this unpersuasive because the report did the 
minimum it was required to do, which was discuss the road.74 Washburn was not 
required to recommend which alternative to choose, so the report did not violate 
the NEPA.75  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that the 
Secretary’s decision did not violate the NEPA or the OPLMA.76 Interestingly, the 
court argued that Congress was at fault for “dooming” the project by requiring 
the Secretary meet the NEPA requirements.77 The Secretary executed the NEPA 
by evaluating the environmental impacts, and not health and safety impacts, 
which the court argued was a mistake by Congress.78 This decision marks the end 
of the road for APA review, but the court hinted that Congress could intervene 
without demanding a NEPA review.79  
                                                 
68  Id.  
69  Id. at *50.  
70  Id. 
71  Id. at *51. 
72  Id. at *54.  
73  Id. at *55.  
74  Id. at *55-56. 
75  Id. at *56. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id.  
79  Id. at *57. 
